Evaluation of the causal effect of a baseline exposure on a morbidity outcome at a fixed time point is often complicated when study participants die before morbidity outcomes are measured. In this setting, the causal effect is only well defined for the principal stratum of subjects who would live regardless of the exposure. Motivated by gerontologic researchers interested in understanding the causal effect of vision loss on emotional distress in a population with a high mortality rate, we investigate the effect among those who would live both with and without vision loss. Since this subpopulation is not readily identifiable from the data and vision loss is not randomized, we introduce a set of scientifically driven assumptions to identify the causal effect. Since these assumptions are not empirically verifiable, we embed our methodology within a sensitivity analysis framework. We apply our method using the first three rounds of survey data from the Salisbury Eye Evaluation, a population-based cohort study of older adults. We also present a simulation study that validates our method.
INTRODUCTION
In studies of older individuals, researchers are often interested in evaluating the effect of exposure on morbidity as well as mortality outcomes. When analyzing morbidity outcomes, the competing risk of death must be taken into account. Any meaningful analysis must recognize that a participant's morbidity outcome at a specified point in time is not defined if he/she died before that time. Gilbert and others (2003) Randomized study, monotonicity, nonparametric estimation, bootstrap standard errors Zhang and Rubin (2003) Randomized study, population-level bounds Hayden and others (2005) Randomized study, assumptions conditioned on covariates, provides identification of the joint distribution of all the potential outcomes, maximum likelihood estimation, addresses missing non-mortality outcomes Proposed method
Observational study, monotonicity, most assumptions conditioned on covariates, does not provide identification of the joint distribution of all the potential outcomes, estimating equations, large sample theory, addresses missing non-mortality outcomes but would be uninfected if randomized to placebo." Zhang and Rubin (2003) discuss population bounds for SACE under no assumptions and under monotonicity, which in their context means that if a subject lives when given a placebo, he/she would also live when given a treatment. Hayden and others (2005) developed a likelihood-based sensitivity analysis procedure for estimating SACE. Their methodology incorporates covariates, does not impose monotonicity, and assumes a cumulative proportional odds model restriction. Their model admits identification of a joint distribution of the potential outcomes. They also address how their method can be adjusted to handle missing outcomes and, for this situation, propose using the bootstrap to obtain standard errors. In this paper, we propose a sensitivity analysis procedure for drawing inference about SACE in the context of observational studies with missing outcomes among observed survivors. Our sensitivity analysis parameterization is similar to that of Gilbert and others (2003) . While we impose monotonicity, our modeling approach does not yield identification of the entire joint distribution of potential outcomes, just features of the joint distribution which are necessary for estimating SACE. In contrast, Hayden and others (2005) seek identification of the entire joint distribution of the counterfactuals and as a consequence require more assumptions (even if monotonicity were imposed). The advantage of their approach is that it admits identification of other functionals of the joint distribution of the potential outcomes, although these functionals are not discussed in either the paper of Hayden and others or this paper.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce our motivating observational study, the Salisbury Eye Evaluation (SEE), in which gerontologic researchers are interested in the effect of vision loss on emotional distress. In Section 3, we introduce the data structure and notation for the SEE study. In Section 4, we mathematically define SACE and present our two alternative sets of identifiability assumptions, indexed by sensitivity analysis parameters. We also discuss additional testable models for our estimation procedure. In Section 5, we introduce our estimators and derive their large sample properties. In Section 6, we apply SACE to the SEE study. We finish with a discussion in Section 7.
An R program to implement our method is available from the authors.
THE SEE
Visual impairment is a common problem in older adults, as 15-20% of adults in their 80s are afflicted (Munoz and others, 2000) . Loss of vision can result in increased dependence on others, less social
Causal inference for non-mortality outcomes 529 interaction, and increased disability. Therefore, these individuals may be at an increased risk of emotional distress, which may lead to further deterioration in health. Some studies have found an association between visual impairment and the emotional distress symptom of depression, but to our knowledge almost all have been cross-sectional (Rovner and others, 1996; Scott and others, 2001; Rovner and Ganguli, 1998; Jorm and others, 1995; Carabellese and others, 1993) . One problem with investigating this relationship longitudinally in older individuals is that death is a competing risk that is associated with both visual impairment and depression (McCarty and others, 2001; Klein and others, 1995; Thompson and others, 1989; Blazer and others, 2001; Schulz and others, 2000; Stern and others, 2001; Black and Markides, 1999) .
To investigate if incident vision loss increases the risk of emotional problems, we used data from the SEE project, a population-based cohort study of older adults (West and others, 1997) . In this study, visual acuity was assessed using the Early Treatment Diabetic Retinopathy Study eye chart, and emotional distress symptoms were assessed using the General Health Questionnaire (GHQ) which rates emotional distress on a scale of 0 to 28 (Goldberg and Hillier, 1979) . Incident vision loss was defined as a loss of two or more lines on an eye chart of the best visual acuity possible with glasses at the second round, 2 years after the baseline round. Those with severe baseline visual impairment who were not able to have at least two lines of vision loss were excluded from the study. The outcome of interest was incident worsened emotional distress at the third round, which occurred 4 years later. Worsened emotional distress is defined by a worsening of four or more points in the total GHQ score. The total GHQ score has been found to have strong correlation with clinically relevant depression (Goldberg and Hillier, 1979) . Table 2 presents summary statistics of our sample. In the second and fourth columns of Table 2 , we present summary statistics for each of these baseline characteristics, stratified by vision loss status. The third and fifth columns present summary statistics for the subgroup who survived past the third round, stratified by vision loss status. As shown in the table, a significant proportion of individuals died before emotional distress could be assessed at the last round (24.7% of those with vision loss versus 15.4% of those without vision loss). These high mortality rates underline the importance of accounting for death as a competing risk in these data.
In addition to death, loss to follow-up and worsening emotional distress symptom rates were higher for those with vision loss as compared to those without vision loss in our study. Within each vision loss stratum, the baseline characteristics for the entire stratum versus the subgroup who survived to round 3 and were not lost to follow-up were comparable. However, there were differences between vision loss strata. Those with vision loss tended to (a) be older, (b) have more comorbidities, (c) be more likely to be male, (d) be more likely to be nonwhite, (e) be more likely to have diabetes, (f) have lower body mass index (BMI), which is often clinically worse in older persons compared with a higher BMI, (g) smoke more, and (h) be better educated. Thus, those with vision loss tended to be less healthy. Not all these differences were statistically significant, however, as shown in Table 2 . We designed our proposed estimator of SACE to correct for bias that could result from such loss to follow-up and baseline differences between those with and without vision loss in the data set. For the analysis in Section 6, our reference population was drawn from the set of subjects who (a) survived through round 2; (b) had measures of visual acuity and emotional distress at round 2; (c) had information on covariates such as age, gender, race, diabetes, hypertension, number of comorbidities, BMI, smoking status, and education at round 2; and (d) had information on mortality through round 3. Missing measures of emotional distress among survivors at round 3 were due to loss to follow-up.
DATA STRUCTURE AND NOTATION
In the potential outcomes framework, it is assumed that, associated with each individual, there are outcomes under two states of nature: one when a person has vision loss and the other when the same person does not have vision loss. Only one of these states of nature is actually observed. Our data structure reflects this assumption. Let D = D(Z ) and Y = Y (Z ) be the observed mortality and worsened distress outcomes. Let R be an indicator of whether a survivor is interviewed at the final survey round in our study (1 if not lost to follow-up, 0 otherwise). We assume that we observed n i.i.d. copies of the observed data, The goal is to use the observed data to draw inference about SACE, the odds ratio (OR) of worsening emotional distress in the group that would survive either with or without vision loss. Specifically, we define
Note, however, that SACE could also have been defined as, say, a relative risk (RR) or risk difference.
In identifying SACE, we will find it useful to define the following quantities which are identifiable from the distribution of the observed data for z = 0, 1: 
IDENTIFICATION OF SACE
In this section, we present assumptions to identify SACE from the observed data distribution. Before turning to these assumptions, we introduce an example, which will be used to demonstrate (a) the difficulty of drawing valid causal inferences from the observed data and (b) how the assumptions are used to identify SACE. Table 3 displays the potential outcomes and a binary covariate (X ) for a hypothetical population of 4500 individuals. Within each level of X , the individuals are spread equally across the three principal strata: those who live regardless of their vision loss (S1) where {D(0) = 0, D(1) = 0}, those who would die if they had vision loss but survive if they did not (S2) where {D(0) = 0, D(1) = 1}, and those who would die both with and without vision loss (S3) where {D(0) = 1, D(1) = 1}. No individuals are in the stratum who would die without vision loss but survive with vision loss (S4) where {D(0) = 1, D(1) = 0}. Among the 1000 who would always be alive with X = 0, there is no emotional distress whatever be their vision loss. Among the 500 who would always be alive with X = 1, there is emotional distress whatever be their vision loss. For the individuals who would die only if they have vision loss, we see that their potential emotional distress outcomes when they have vision loss are not defined and two-thirds would have emotional distress when they do not have vision loss. For the individuals who die regardless of B. L. EGLESTON AND OTHERS Table 3 . Potential outcome and covariate data for a hypothetical population
Illustrative example
Always survivors ( their state of vision, their potential emotional distress outcomes are undefined. The causal effects among these latter strata are undefined. Causal inferences are only meaningful in the stratum of those who would always remain alive. In this stratum, the causal OR of emotional distress for vision loss versus no vision loss is 1 (i.e. no causal effect).
Only a coarse version of Table 3 is observable. In Table 4 , we present the observed data. As in Table 3 , there are 3000 subjects with X = 0 and 1500 with X = 1. Within levels of X , subjects are spread equally across the vision status stratum. Regardless of X , subjects who have vision loss have an odds of dying of two and subjects without vision loss have an odds of dying of 0.5. Among the survivors, half of the subjects have mental health assessments. For subjects who survive, and have mental health assessments, the OR of emotional distress between subjects with and without vision loss is 0.5. An incorrect interpretation of this analysis would suggest that, overall, vision loss is protective against emotional distress and the protection holds only for the subgroup with X = 0. Why do we see this result? For subjects who survive and have mental health assessments, the subgroup with no vision loss (see lines 1-4 of Table 4 ) is a mixture of those who would always remain alive and those who would die only if they had vision loss (half S1 and half S2), while the subgroup with vision loss (see lines 7-8 of Table 4 ) consists of subjects who would always remain alive (S1). Thus, these subgroups are not comparable with regard to their principal strata. Since the rate of emotional distress in S2 is higher than that in S1 as illustrated in Table 3 , we see why vision loss "looks" protective.
Assumptions
We introduce the following non-identifiable assumptions in order to identify SACE from the distribution of the observed data. To identify SACE, we can separately identify (a)
We make the common Stable Unit Treatment Value Assumption (Rubin, 1980) which states that an individual's potential outcomes are unrelated to both the vision loss status of other study participants and the mechanism by which the individual lost their vision. Below, we list the assumptions specific to our estimator and label them using terminology common to the field of causal inference where appropriate (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983) .
Assumption 1. D(0) D(1) (Monotonicity).
Assumption 1 states that the development of vision loss does not improve the mortality outcome of an individual. This assumption is similar to assumptions made by Gilbert and others (2003) and Zhang and Rubin (2003) . One might challenge this assumption if vision loss reduces mortality by restricting activities (e.g. walking) that might cause death in older adults (e.g. falls). In our analysis, we believe that such a protective effect of vision loss is at most negligible since visual impairment and vision loss have been shown to have a strong relationship with mortality (see Freeman and others, 2005 , for a review). For the illustrative example, this assumption implies that no subjects are in the principal stratum of subjects who die only without vision loss (S4). In column 9 of Table 4 , the stratum S4 is removed. Thus, for subjects in lines 7-12, we know their principal stratum.
Assumption 2. Z ⊥P|X (Strong ignorability).
Assumption 2 states that the development of vision loss is unrelated to the potential outcomes given the covariates. Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) referred to this assumption as "strong ignorability of treatment assignment." Since vision loss is not randomized, we assume that within strata of confounders there are no unmeasured differences between those who lose vision and those who do not. One implication of this assumption is that
In the illustration, where X is a one-dimensional binary variable, g 0 (0) = 2/3, g 0 (1) = 2/3, g 1 (0) = 1/3, and g 1 (1) = 1/3.
This assumption states that, for survivors, missingness of the morbidity outcome is independent of the value of the outcome within levels of exposure and covariates. This is related to the "missing at random" assumption of Rubin (1976) . It allows one to identify the probability of emotional distress in the group of survivors with missing emotional distress outcomes, within levels of Z and X. Together with Assumption 2, we have that
In our illustrative example, h 0 (0) = 0.5, h 0 (1) = 0.5, h 1 (0) = 0, and h 1 (1) = 1. Further, we can compute some key quantities that will be needed in the identification of SACE. In particular,
, and E[h 1 (X )g 1 (X )] = 1 9 . Here, we show how these assumptions can be used to identify SACE.
Under Assumptions 1-3,
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To see this, note that
The first equality follows from Assumption 1. The second equality follows from the properties of conditional and unconditional expectations. The third equality follows from Assumptions 2 and 3 and from the definition of h 1 (X) and g 1 (X). 
Such mixing equations are commonly used to identify causal estimands using observed data (Gilbert and others, 2003; Zhang and Rubin, 2003) . Under Assumptions 1-3, the left-hand side of (4.2) is identifiable since
and the "mixing" probability P[D(1) = 0|D(0) = 0] is identifiable since
These equalities can be proved using similar manipulations as in the proof of (4.1).
By specifying how P[Y (0) = 1|S2] relates to P[Y (0) = 1|S1] in (4.2), we can then solve (4.2) for
where τ RR is a specified constant, interpreted as the RR of worsening emotional distress without vision loss when comparing the group of individuals that would survive without vision loss but die with vision loss (S2) to the group of individuals who would live regardless of vision loss (S1). The constant τ RR is nonidentifiable from the observed data because we do not know to which principal stratum individuals who are observed in our study to survive without vision loss belong. To identify the principal strata directly, we would need to observe the counterfactual mortality outcomes that individuals would have had if they had vision loss for those in the study who did not actually develop vision loss. Since we do not observe those counterfactual outcomes, we need this assumption. Our final inferences about SACE will be displayed in the form of a sensitivity analysis. That is, SACE will be estimated over a range of τ RR considered plausible by subject matter experts.
Gilbert and others (2003) posed a similar assumption, while Hayden and others (2005) made one based on covariates. From a sensitivity analysis perspective, this modeling decision is critical. If we did condition on covariates and the covariates were high-dimensional, subject matter experts might find it unreasonable to assume a constant RR across all levels of X. If τ RR were chosen to depend on X, then the sensitivity analysis would become too complicated to display. Under the conceptualization of the problem of Hayden and others (2005) , we would need many more τ -like parameters, even with our monotonicity assumption, to identify our estimand, particularly when dealing with continuous outcomes. Hayden and others (2005) reduce the dimension of the sensitivity parameters in their work by assuming proportionality across all levels of X.
A possible drawback to our approach is that there may be no immediate "anchoring point" of τ RR which is considered plausible by scientific experts. For example, τ RR = 1, which implies Y (0) is independent of D (1) given D(0) = 0, may be considered implausible. Instead, experts might be more comfortable anchoring the sensitivity analysis at an assumption that states that Y (0) is independent of D(1) given D(0) = 0 and X. This assumption is part of what Hayden and others (2005) call "explainable nonrandom survival." We refer to it as "counterfactual conditional independence" (CCI) to emphasize that it is a conditional independence assumption involving two variables that we could never observe on the same person (Y (0) is only observed if a person does not have vision loss, while D(1) is only observed if a person does have vision loss). In our framework, τ RR = 1 is simply "counterfactual independence," where we do not condition on any covariates to obtain independence. One can identify the unconditional τ RR which corresponds to CCI. Then, an expert can use this value of τ RR as their anchoring point in the sensitivity analysis. While anchoring might be a useful guide for scientific experts who desire a unique point estimate around which to base the sensitivity analysis, it is not essential. A sensitivity analysis can be performed over any range of τ RR that is plausible, and this range of estimates can be reported. If the anchoring point is not within the sensitivity range, then researchers will have to reconsider whether the anchoring point assumption is scientifically meaningful or whether the range of τ RR needs to be expanded.
Under Assumptions 1-3 and 4a,
, for all τ RR . Equation .7) is imposed to guarantee that the solution is a proper probability.
Using (4.1) and (4.6), we can compute SACE as a function of τ RR . We denote this function as SACE τ RR (·). This function, defined for τ RR satisfying constraint (4.7), can be shown to be increasing
In our illustration, the unknowable value of τ RR is 2. Using this value, we see that 
Assumption 4b.
odds
where τ OR is a specified constant, interpreted in the same manner as τ OR but on the OR scale. Under Assumptions 1-3 and 4b,
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This result is derived by plugging (4.3) and (4.4) into (4.2), substituting
for P[Y (0) = 1|S2], and solving for the unknown of interest, P[Y (0) = 1|S1]. The solution is trivial when τ OR = 1. When τ OR = 1, the solution is found by solving a quadratic equation, of which only the above solution is a proper probability. The solution is a decreasing function of τ OR . There are no constraints on τ OR . Using (4.1) and (4.9), we can compute SACE as a function of τ OR . We denote this function as SACE τ OR (·). This function can be shown to be increasing in τ OR .
In the illustration, the true τ OR = 4. In (4.9), a(4)
and SACE τ OR (4) = 1. This correctly indicates that there is no causal effect of vision loss on emotional distress for those who would always survive. Figure 2 displays the function SACE τ OR (·) for all τ OR 0. As above, the unconditional τ OR that is obtained under CCI is also 1, leading to invalid inference.
Study specific assumption. τ RR 1 and τ OR 1.
This assumption encodes a plausible belief about the direction of the RR of emotional distress in a world in which no one has vision loss when comparing two principal strata. The direction implies that the risk in such a world of no vision loss would be larger among the group who would live without vision loss only (but would die if they had vision loss) than in the group who would live both with and without vision loss. This assumption seems reasonable in that the group that would die if they had vision loss is likely less healthy and more frail than the group that would survive if they had vision loss. However, those who see this belief as arbitrary could estimate effects over any range of appropriate sensitivity values. In our example, the true values of τ RR and τ OR are 2 and 4, respectively. In other studies, researchers might use scientific information to obtain different bounds on the sensitivity parameter.
Models for g z (X) and h z (X)
In the identification formulas above, we see that P[Y (z) = 1|S1] can be expressed as a function of
. This implies that SACE is a function of these quantities (see (4.6) and (4.9)). Thus, we need to compute g z (X) and h z (X). When X is high-dimensional, it is not possible to estimate these quantities non-parametrically, due to the curse of dimensionality. To achieve an estimator of SACE which converges at √ n rates, we will need to impose some lower-dimensional restrictions on these quantities. Specifically, we assume that, for z = 0, 1,
It is easy to show that E[U(O; ψ ψ ψ * )] = 0. By the theory of M-estimation (Huber, 1964) , it can be shown that, for ψ ψ ψ
The covariance matrix * can be estimated by
SACE(·)
Under Assumptions 1-3, 4a, (4.10) and (4.11), SACE becomes,
For fixed τ RR satisfying τ RR > 1, this function is continuously differentiable for all ψ ψ ψ * ∈ . We estimate SACE τ RR (τ RR ) by SACE τ RR (τ RR , ψ ψ ψ). The large sample theory for this estimator can be found by employing the delta method. Specifically,
and SACE τ RR (τ RR , ψ ψ ψ) is the gradient of SACE τ RR (τ RR , ψ ψ ψ) with respect to ψ ψ ψ. The variance-covariance matrix τ RR (τ RR ; ψ ψ ψ * ) is consistently estimated by τ RR (τ RR ; ψ ψ ψ). Under Assumptions 1-3, 4b, (4.10) and (4.11), SACE becomes
For fixed τ OR satisfying τ OR > 1, this function is continuously differentiable for all ψ ψ ψ * ∈ . We estimate SACE τ OR (τ OR ) by SACE τ OR (τ OR , ψ ψ ψ). The large sample theory for this estimator can be found by employing the delta method as above. Specifically,
where
and SACE τ OR (τ OR , ψ ψ ψ) is the gradient of SACE τ OR (τ OR , ψ ψ ψ) with respect to ψ ψ ψ. The variance-covariance matrix τ OR (τ OR ; ψ ψ ψ * ) is consistently estimated by τ OR (τ OR ; ψ ψ ψ). To guarantee that Wald-type confidence intervals for SACE are nonnegative, we recommend that the confidence interval first be computed for log(SACE) and then exponentiated. The asymptotic distribution of log(SACE) is found by the delta method.
We conducted a simulation study to evaluate the finite sample behavior of our estimation procedure for SACE, the results of which are presented in the supplementary material available at Biostatistics online (http://www.biostatistics.oxfordjournals.org). Overall, the results suggest that the inferences made using our asymptotic theory are generally valid. Misspecifying the correct sensitivity parameter, τ RR or τ OR , however, can lead to substantial bias. This underlines the importance of a sensitivity analysis approach to presenting results when the true τ RR or τ OR is unknown.
DATA ANALYSIS
We used data from the SEE study to demonstrate our method. Of the 2520 subjects in the study, 32 were not at risk of losing two lines of vision because of severe visual impairment, 137 died before their second round interview, and 191 had missing information or were lost to follow-up at or before the second round. These subjects were excluded. Of the remaining 2160 subjects, 162 had vision loss diagnosed at the second interview. In this data set, the covariates, X, are age, gender, race, diabetes, hypertension, number of comorbidities, BMI, smoking status, and education.
We first used a naive logistic regression to investigate the effect of vision loss on emotional distress among the group observed to survive conditional on X. After adjusting for covariates, subjects with vision loss have 1.26 times the odds of worsening emotional distress as compared to those without vision loss (95% CI: [0.65, 2.46]). The increase in the odds of distress is of modest clinical relevance and is not statistically different than 1 at the 0.05 Type-I error level.
Next, we employed our sensitivity analysis approach to estimate SACE. We fit models (4.10) and (4.11), in which the functions g † z (X; α α α z ) and h † z (X; β β β z ) are assumed to be linear in age, sex, race, diabetic and hypertensive status, number of comorbidities, lowest quartile BMI, having ever smoked, and having a high school education.
Combining these results with Assumptions 1-3, we then estimated the key components needed to identify SACE. The estimate of P[Y (1) = 1|D(1) = 0], the probability of emotional distress among survivors if everyone had been "assigned" vision loss, is 14.8% (95% CI: [8.6%, 24.2%]), higher than the (potentially) confounded estimate, from Table 2 , of 12.4%. The estimate of P[Y (0) = 1|D(0) = 0], the corresponding probability of emotional distress if everyone had been "assigned" no vision loss, is 10.6% (95% CI: [9.0%, 12.3%]), which is slightly higher than the (potentially) confounded estimate of 10.4%. The estimated conditional probability of surviving with vision loss given that one would also survive without vision loss, Figure 3 presents the estimated values of SACE and associated confidence intervals over τ OR ranging from 1 to 15 and τ RR ranging from 1 to 7. We see that when the probability of emotional distress is the same regardless of whether an individual's potential outcomes indicate that an individual always lives or only lives without vision loss (τ OR = τ RR = 1), then the naive OR and SACE are similar. As τ OR and τ RR get larger, the probability of emotional distress given an individual always lives gets much smaller than the probability of emotional distress given that an individual only lives without vision loss. As a result, SACE gets larger. The slopes are very shallow because the estimated proportion of subjects in S2 is small. The unconditional τ RR and τ OR that correspond to CCI are both approximately 1.3 and 1.3, respectively. Under CCI, SACE = 1.50 (95% CI: [0.80, 2.82]).
DISCUSSION
Our method of accounting for death as a competing risk provides a meaningful, readily interpretable, and easy to implement causal estimand. In our data analysis, we found that the point estimate of SACE was similar to that of the naive OR when there was no difference in the probability of worsening emotional distress symptoms between those who die only with vision loss versus those who never die whatever be their vision loss status. There were some changes in SACE over the specified range of τ OR and τ RR , but the results were only marginally significant. Further, the magnitude of the effect of vision loss on emotional distress seems modest in terms of clinical relevance except for large values of τ OR or τ RR .
SACE does not correct for bias of the naive OR; the two ORs are measuring different quantities. The naive OR measures the effect of vision loss on emotional distress among those who are observed to live. Under Assumption 1, some of those who we observed to survive without vision loss would have died with vision loss; our causal estimand excludes this group. For this reason, even when τ OR or τ RR equals 1, the interpretation of SACE and the naive OR are different and the point estimates can be expected to differ, as was the case in our analysis. One potential criticism of this work is that vision loss is not manipulable in the same manner as a randomized treatment. As Holland (1986) wrote, many have historically believed that Rubin's causal model is only applicable if one can conceptualize being able to manipulate the exposure. Under this conceptualization, immutable attributes such as sex are not considered causes. Changing the sex changes the person in too many ways to consider sex to be an underlying cause of anything. While vision loss may not be as manipulable as a randomized treatment, vision loss is an increasingly preventable and treatable condition; proper treatment can prevent vision loss due to glaucoma while laser-assisted in situ keratomileusis (LASIK) and cataract surgery can be used to reverse vision loss. As demonstrated by Freeman and others (2005) , vision researchers are interested in causal effects of vision loss.
The methods described here should be of use to many researchers who examine outcomes when death is a strong competing risk in observational studies. We are confident that scientists will increasingly use estimators of SACE in their substantive work once they become more familiar with the concept of principal stratification, and once computer programs to estimate SACE are made more widely available.
